Abstract-We present a class of evolutionary games involving large populations that have many pairwise interactions between randomly selected players. The fitness of a player depends not only on the actions chosen in the interaction but also on the individual state of the players. Players have a finite life time during which they participate in several local interactions and take actions. The actions taken by a player determine not only the immediate fitness but also the transition probabilities to its next individual state. We define and characterize the Evolutionary Stable Strategies for these games and propose a method to compute them. We illustrate the model and results through a networking problem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
E
VOLUTIONARY games have been developed by J. Maynard Smith [2] to model the evolution of population sizes as a result of competition between them that occurs through many local pairwise interactions, i.e. interactions between randomly chosen pairs of individuals. Central in evolutionary games is the concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS), which is a distribution of (deterministic or mixed) actions such that if used, the population is immune against penetration of mutations. This notion is stronger than that of Nash equilibrium as ESS is robust against a deviation of a whole fraction of the population where as the Nash equilibrium is defined with respect to possible deviations of a single player. A second foundation of evolutionary games is the replicator dynamics that describes the dynamics of the sizes of the populations as a result of the fitness they receive in interactions. Maynard Smith formally introduced both, without needing an explicit modeling of stochastic features. We shall call this the deterministic evolutionary game.
Randomness is implicitly hinted in the requirement of robustness against mutations, and indeed the ESS is defined through robustness against any mutation. Random aspects can be explicitly included in the modeling of evolutionary games. We first note that since deterministic evolutionary games deal with large populations, it may provide an interpretation of the deterministic game as a limit of smaller games that included randomness [stochastic games [5] ) that has been averaged out by some strong law of large numbers. Such an interpretation can be found in [11] . Yet, other sources of randomness have been introduced into evolutionary games. Some authors have added small noise to the replicator dynamics in order to avoid the problem of having the dynamics stuck in some local minimum, see [12] , [13] , [15] and references therein. 1 In this paper we introduce another class of stochastic evolutionary games, which we call "Markov Decision Evolutionary Games" (MDEG). There are again many local interactions among individuals belonging to large populations of players. Each individual has a finite life time during which (i) it may move among different individual states, and (ii) it interacts several times with other users; the actions taken by a player along with those with which it interacts, determine not only its immediate fitness but also its individual transition probabilities to the next state it will have. An individual seeks to maximize the expected sum of its immediate fitness during its life time.
Throughout this paper we shall make the assumption that the transition probabilities of a player do not depend on the actions of other players.
A simple application of an MDEG to mobile communications has been introduced in [6] . Mobile terminals transmit packets occasionally. Their destination occasionally may receive simultaneously a transmission from another terminal which results in a collision. It is assumed however that even when packets collide, one of the packets can be received correctly if transmitted at a higher power. The immediate fitness rewards successful transmissions and penalizes energy consumption. Each mobile decides at each slot what its power level will be. In [6] , this decision is allowed to depend on the depletion level of the battery, which serves as the "individual state." The battery is considered to be either in the state "Full" (F) in which case there are two power levels available, or "Almost Empty" (AE) in which only the weak power level is available. Transmission at high power at state F results in a larger probability of moving to state AE. We present in Section III-D an extension of this problem.
In contrast to the above simple application, in which decisions can be taken only at one individual state, we develop in this paper a general theory for computing an ESS where decisions can be taken at all individual states, where the fitness depends not only on the actions but also on the individual states of the interacting individuals, and where the available actions may depend on the individual state.
An interesting application of MDEG is the dynamic version of the well known Hawk and Dove game in which some of the features of MDEG are already present, [7] - [9] . These models also consider pairwise interactions and study properties of the equilibria. The first two references study a repeated game approach to that problem (rather than an evolutionary game). In [9] the authors study an average cost MDEG with transition probabilities that depend only on the actions of the users; the authors obtain interesting structural properties of the equilibrium using dynamic programming tools. In our paper we go beyond the dynamic programming approach and propose a methodology for transforming the problem into an equivalent standard evolutionary game. This approach consists of using the expected occupation measures of the players as decision variables which allows us to transform the problem into a bi-matrix game. A similar approach has been used in [17] for solving stochastic games in which transition probabilities are controlled by only one player.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After a brief description of standard evolutionary games presented next, we introduce in Section III the model of MDEG and define the main solution concept, the Weak ESS, in that context. We provide a method for computing this ESS in Section IV which provides ESS within mixed strategies. Some alternative view point through dynamic programming is introduced in Section V to provide a characterization of the ESS in stationary policies. There is another equilibrium concept in a MDEG which is the Strong ESS. The definition and characterization of a Strong ESS are provided in Section VI. In Section VII we compare the mixed and the stationary ESS in an energy control problem. This is followed by a concluding section.
II. EQUILIBRIUM IN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
Consider a large population of players. Each individual plays at times , a matrix game against some player randomly selected within an infinite population. The choice of the other player at different times is independent. All players have the same finite action space . Each time it plays, a player may use a mixed strategy , i.e. a probability measure over the set of actions. We define by the expected payoff for our tagged individual if it uses a mixed strategy (also called policy) when meeting another individual who adopts the mixed strategy . This payoff is called "fitness" and strategies with larger fitness are expected to propagate faster in a population. If we define a payoff matrix , then and the payoff function is indeed linear in and . A mixed strategy is called a Nash equilibrium if (1) Suppose that the whole population uses a strategy and that a small fraction (called "mutations") adopts another strategy . Evolutionary forces are expected to select against if 
or (4) In fact, if condition (3) is satisfied, then the fraction of mutations in the population will tend to decrease (as it has a lower fitness, meaning a lower growth rate). Thus the strategy is then immune to mutations. If it does not but if still the condition (4) holds, then a population using is "weakly" immune against a mutation using . Indeed, if the mutant's population grows, then we shall frequently have individuals with strategy competing with mutants. In such cases, the condition ensures that the growth rate of the original population exceeds that of the mutants.
The conditions on ESS can be related and interpreted in terms of a Nash equilibrium in a matrix game. Note that where as a mixed Nash equilibrium is known to exist in a matrix game, an ESS may not exist.
We have the following result saying that a mixed Nash equilibrium of a symmetric bimatrix game (i.e. a game with two actions for each player) is an ESS. We will use this result in Section VII.
Proposition 2.1: In a symmetric game with two actions for each player and no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, there exists a unique mixed Nash equilibrium which is an ESS.
The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix.
III. MODEL
We use a hierarchical description of the system composed of a model for the individual player and a global model for aggregating individual's behavior.
A. Model for Individual Player
A player arrives at some random global time . It has a clock that dictates the times at which interactions with other players occur. It is involved in interactions that occur according to a Poisson process with rate . After a random number of time periods, the player leaves the system and is replaced by another one. This will be made precise below. During the player's life time, each time the timer clicks, the player interacts with another randomly selected player.
We associate with each player a Markov Decision Process (MDP) embedded at the instants of the clicks.
The parameters of the MDP are given by the tuple where • is the set of possible individual states of the player.
• is the set of available actions. For each state , a subset of actions is available.
• is the set of transition probabilities; for each and , is the probability to move from state to state taking action .
is allowed to be smaller than 1 such that any user can leave the system after taking his action. Define further • The set of behavioral policies is . A general policy is a sequence where is a mapping between the local history to the set of distributions over the action space . The local history is the set of states and actions prior to time together with the state at time . The dependence on time is a local one: it concerns only the individual's clock; a player is not assumed to use policies that make use of some global clocks. A policy is an individual decision which defines the sequences of action which will be taken by the individual at each individual's clock.
• Define the set of Markov policies . A policy is Markov if depends only on the current state . A Markov policy can thus be identified with a sequence where is a mapping from the set of states to the set of probability distributions over the action space.
• A policy is said to be stationary if it is a Markov policy which is time independent. It assigns to each state a probability distribution over the actions.
• Define to be the set of pure stationary policies (also called deterministic policies) i.e. policies that assign to each state a given action.
• Define the set of mixed policies. These are non-behavioral (they are not subset of ). A mixed policy is identified with a probability measure over the set . A player that uses a mixed policy that corresponds to first chooses the th pure stationary policy with probability and then uses during his whole life time that same policy. Occupation Measure: Often we encounter the notion of individual states in evolutionary games; but usually the population size at a particular state is fixed. In our case the choices of actions of an individual determine the fraction of time it would spend at each state. Hence the fraction of the whole population that will be at a given state may depend on the distribution of strategies in the population. In order to model this dependence we first need to describe the expected amount of time that an individual spends at a given state when it follows a strategy and its initial state at time 1 is distributed according to a probability over . Note that this initial distribution , at local time 0, is the same for all individuals and the population is totally symmetric. More generally, we define the expected number of time units during which it is at state and it chooses action . Finally, is called the occupation measure corresponding to a policy .
Define the probability for a user to be in state , at individual or local time , using action under policy when the initial state has a probability distribution . Further define . is a sub-probability measure as may be smaller than one. The lifetime of an individual is identified as the time interval before leaves . We have Define the expected lifetime of a player corresponding to a given and as . We shall assume throughout that for a given , is finite. We know from [14] that , so the assumption is equivalent to requesting that is finite for all . Unless otherwise stated, we consider from now policies among the set of stationary policies . We know from the theory of MDP that if all players use a policy which is an equilibrium among the stationary policies, then no player can benefit by a unilateral deviation to any policy, including to nonstationary ones. Hence is an equilibrium among all policies.
B. Interactions and System Model
We have a large population of individuals. As in standard evolutionary games, there are many pairwise interactions between randomly selected pairs.
Let be the immediate reward that a player receives when it is at state and it uses action while interacting with a player who is in state that uses action .
When the whole population uses a policy , then at any time which is either fixed or is an individual time of an arbitrary player, the system state is independent of and is given by for all . Then is the stationary system state:
is the fraction of the population in stationary regime at individual state and that use action when all the population uses stationary strategy . We denote also by the immediate reward that a player receives when it is at state and it uses action while interacting with a player using the policy . Then, we have Consider an arbitrary tagged player and let and be its state and action at time (as measured on its individual clock). Then his expected immediate reward at that time is given by Assume now that a player arrives at the system at time 0. The global expected fitness when using a policy is then When is concentrated on state we write with some abuse of notation . We shall often omit the index (in case it is taken to be fixed).
Considering the stationary state of the system, the global expected fitness simplifies to (5) This remark would not hold if the policy of a player could depend on the absolute time or on the behavior (i.e. the actions) of other players. For example, in the standard replicator dynamics, the policy of a player adapts to the instantaneous fitness which depends also on the actions of the other players in the population.
On the other hand, since players of a given class are undistinguishable, and since the lifetime distribution of a mobile depends only on his local time, we may expect the remark to hold. The validity of the remark is beyond the scope of the paper.
Definition 3.1: We shall say that two strategies and are equivalent if the corresponding occupation measures are equal. We shall write . Note that if and are equivalent policies for a given player then for any used by the rest of the population, the fitness expressed by (5) under and under are the same. Indeed, the fitness depends only of the policy used through the occupation measures, that is
C. Defining the Weak ESS
With the expression (5) for the fitness, we observe that we are again in the framework of Section II and can use Theorem 2.1 to characterize the weak ESS in the MDEG: Definition 3.2: A strategy is a weak ESS, denoted by WESS, for the MDEG if and only if the following conditions hold. is a Nash equilibrium, that is satisfying (6) Moreover (7) This other notion of equilibrium is related to the equivalent class in terms of occupation measure.
Lemma 3.1: A policy is a Weak Evolutionary Stable Strategy for the MDEG if and only if it is a Weak Evolutionary
Stable Strategy for the following modified global fitness function: (8) The advantage of the new form of the fitness function (8) is that it is bilinear in the occupation measures of the players that interact with each other. The set of occupation measures will be shown to be a polytope whose extreme points correspond to strategies in . This will allow us to transform the MDEG to a standard EG.
We could use the following definition as an equivalent definition of a WESS for a MDEG.
Definition 3.3: A strategy is said to be a Weak Evolutionary Stable Strategy if for every
there exists some such that the following holds for all :
In (9), we use a convex combination of two policies. We delay the definition of this to the next section (see Remark 4.1). The equivalence between definition (3.2) and definition (3.3) is a direct consequence of proposition (4.1) which we shall introduce later; it shows that an MDEG can be transformed into an equivalent standard evolutionary game.
D. Application to Energy Control in Wireless Networks
We next illustrate the MDEG setting with a problem that arises in dynamic power control in mobile networks. A special case of this framework (where a choice between several control actions exists in one state only) has been studied in [6] .
Users participate in local competitions for the access to a shared medium in order to transmit their packets. An individual state of each mobile represents the energy level at the user's battery which, for simplicity, we assume to take finitely many values, denoted by . In each state , each mobile has two available actions and which correspond respectively to high power and low power . We consider an Aloha-type game where a mobile transmits a packet with success during a slot if:
• the mobile is the only one to transmit during this slot, which we assume occurs with probability ; • the mobile transmits with high power and the other mobile uses low power. The reward function depends only on the transmission powers, that is, the action of the mobile and the one in competition with him. Then the reward is the summation of the probability (probability to be the only transmitter at the clock) and the probability depending on the action of the individuals in interactions. That is For each state , the transition probability may be non-zero (for both ) only for . Then, as the two possible transitions are to remain at the same energy level or move to the next lower one, we simplify the notation and use to denote the probability of remaining at energy level using action . We have the following modelling assumptions on the transition probabilities which are motivated by the application.
• For all states , we have because using less power induces higher probability to remain in the same energy level.
• For all states and for both actions , we have because less battery energy the mobile has, less is the probability to remain at the same energy level. We consider the three states and then the set of the deterministic policies is composed of the following four couples:
, , and ; where the first element is the action taken in state 1 and the second one is the action taken by a mobile in state 2. We denote these strategies by , , and . We recall that in state 0, there is no more actions available as the mobile has no more energy.
We present the solution of this problem in Section IV-B.
IV. COMPUTING THE WESS
Define the set of occupation measures achieved by all (individual) policies in some subset as
It will turn out that the expected fitness of an individual (defined in next subsection) will depend on the strategy of that individual only through . We are therefore interested in the following characteristic of (see [10] , [14] , has a Nash equilibrium within mixed policies and within stationary policies.
Each ESS in the equivalent standard evolutionary game defines a WESS in MDEG. However ESS need not exist in an evolutionary game, and therefore a WESS need not exist in MDEG.
B. Application to Energy Control in Wireless Networks (Continued)
We pursue the example described in Section III-D applying the latest transformation in order to obtain the WESS for this MDEG. Indeed, we will find the ESS for the related EG game which will be written as a matrix game with dimension 4. In order to find the equilibrium of this matrix game, we have to compute the fitness for all policies and . In a first step, we have to compute the occupation measure corresponding to each policy ; for that we need the probability for a user to be in each state, at time , using action under policy . At initial time , a mobile always starts with a battery full of energy, that is . We describe the matrix game with the two following matrices: and with and , , , . The computation of this matrix is described in Appendix 0a.
Then we obtain the following modified fitnesses depending on the policies in the following matrix:
The WESS of the MDEG which model energy control behaviors in wireless networks is obtained in finding the ESS of the standard EG with the matrix of fitnesses given by .
Remark 4.2:
Using the MDEG approach, we have been able to solve MDEG in a problem with higher dimensionality than that of [6] (which we could only solve for the case where the decision problem is restricted to choose among two actions in only one state).
V. WESS AND DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
In Section IV we transformed the MDEG into a standard EG whose actions correspond to the set of deterministic policies. Mixed policies are then interpreted as selecting randomly one deterministic policy.
The set of such policies is huge as the number of states and actions can be important. We are therefore interested in obtaining WESS policies within other classes of policies.
We consider for the rest of the paper, the class of stationary policies. It follows from Lemma 4.1 (ii) that there is a stationary equilibrium policy if and only if there is an equivalent mixed equilibrium policy. Then, taking this into consideration, we shall restrict in the rest of the paper to stationary (possibly randomized) policies.
Theorem 5.1: (i) A necessary condition for a policy to be a Weak Evolutionary Stable Strategy is that for all stationary .
(ii) Assume that the following set of dynamic programming equations holds: For all state (10) Then for any . Proof: Part (i) follows directly from definition 3.2 of an WESS for MDEG and the theorem 2.1.
(ii) Now, (10) can be interpreted as a one step of policy iteration performed by a player which solves an MDP given that all other players use . Equation (10) 
The MDEG approach provides an algorithmic solution that allows one to compute the WESS where as the dynamic programming approach has so far enabled us to characterize the WESS but not to provide a general solution algorithm. (ii) We have used the dynamic programming approach successfully in [6] for obtaining the WESS in some specific power control game. We stated the dynamic programming approach here in a general context which is not limited to a particular application.
VI. STRONG ESS
Under our previous definition 3.2 of WESS, a WESS could be invaded by another policy provided that and have the same occupation measure:
. We now propose a characterization of another version of ESS through dynamic programming for which an ESS cannot be invaded by any other policy . . From (12) we get similarly for all . Since the inequality is strict for at least one state then together with the condition on we get . Thus by (11) , is a SESS. Remark 6.1: Given a stationary policy , unless it is a pure policy there is always a different equivalent mixed policy in terms of definition 3.1. A way to compute it is described in [1] . We conclude that a stationary policy that is not pure cannot be a strong ESS. Of course, if the stationary policy is already a pure one then it is at the same time a (degenerate) mixed stationary. Thus it may be a SESS.
In [6] we use a dynamic programming approach in order to compute the WESS but we limit our study to a stationary policy. We conclude that whenever this WESS is not pure, it is not a SESS. In the next section, we compare the result obtain in [6] with the WESS obtained by transforming the MDEG into a standard EG.
VII. COMPARISON
We compare our result obtained in [6] using the dynamic programming approach with the one described in Section IV.
The model considered in [6] assumes that the mobile cannot transmit with high power in state 1. Then both models are identical if we restrict the deterministic policies to and . The WESS of the MDEG is the ESS of a standard EG defined by through the related matrix game (that describes the pairwise interactions) which is the restriction of to policies and . We now look at the ESS where is the probability of choosing policy obtained at the equilibrium of this matrix game. This relation proves that is a WESS for our MDEG. We are able to compare the occupation measure in state 2, that is state in [6] . The ESS computed in [6] is obtained when restricting to following stationary policies: each time state is visited, actions are chosen according to the same probability measure denoted by a parameter . This policy is denoted and is defined in [6] . This is different than the WESS obtained here in mixed policies, where there is a single initial randomization between pure strategies, which means that a mobile uses the same action each time state is reached. We now look at the case when . After some calculations, the ESS obtained in [6] gives
The occupation measure in state is:
Then we obtain the occupation measure For the WESS , the mean occupation measure in state is given by
Then we obtain the occupation measure We compare numerically the parameter that defines the stationary WESS (i.e. the probability of choosing high power at state 2) with the parameter that defines the mixed WESS (i.e., the probability to use always high power when at state 2) depending on the probability in order to validate our results.
We observe in Fig. 1 that the parameters are equal when they are pure but different otherwise in the mixed case. For example when , the probability that a mobile has to be alone is very low, both WESS are equal to one, the mobile uses high power level. When , we have the probabilities at the WESS and . Finally, when the probability is high, in a given scale, both WESS are equal to zero, mobile Fig. 1 . Comparison of the WESS from [6] and depending on the probability p.
uses low power level. We remark that the probability is larger then the corresponding whenever they do not correspond to pure policies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied a new class of evolutionary games which we call MDEG, where the decision of each player determine transition probabilities between individual state. We have illustrated this class of game through an energy control problem in wireless networks. We have introduced already in [6] a definition of ESS strategies in stationary policies in a particular simple MDEG in which only in one state there are decisions to be taken. If we apply directly that definition to general policies (we call this here a Strong ESS) it turns out that when abandoning the restriction to stationary policies, even in this simple model there are no ESS (except for some restricted choice of parameters that results in some pure ESS). We solved this problem by defining a weaker notion of ESS using occupation measures. We have then proposed methods to determine weak and strong ESS. In perspective, we propose to look at a more general MDEG where individual transition probabilities depend on the actions of the opponents. Also we are interested in adapting to MDEG population dynamics like the replicator ones that are well studied in the EG literature.
APPENDIX
A. Computation of the Matrix of the Related EG
In this appendix we show the computation of each elements of the standard EG derived from the MDEG of energy control.
For the initial state 2, we have the following probabilities at time :
For the intermediate state 1, we have the following probabilities at time :
For the absorbent state 0 the probability to take an action is null because no actions are available is this state. Now, we are able to compute the occupation measure through the expected number of time units during which a user is in state and it chooses action corresponding to a policy . 
B. Proof of Proposition 2.1
Let the bimatrix game defines by the following matrix:
If the matrix satisfies (no strict Nash equilibria)
then it has a unique mixed Nash equilibrium with . By definition of a Nash equilibrium, we have that for all mixed strategy 
